I . SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
An early argument for the superiority of consumption taxes over income taxes was formulated by Hobbes in 1651. John Stuart Mill and, in more recent tlmes, Kaldor (1955) have presented arguments in favor of consumption taxes relative to income taxes.2 Mill's concern was with the double taxation of savings implicit in an income tax, a double taxation that a consumption tax avoids. However, what should matter is not how often one is taxed but rather how heavily one is taxed. An income tax leads to a heavier taxation of deferred (future) consumption relative to current consumption, while a consumption tax that is uniform over time imposes the same burden on current and future consumption. Therefore, the choice between consumption and income taxation can be expressed as a question over the optimal rates of taxation of present and future consumption. In a traditional public finance approach, this question has 1. Bull ( 1993), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi ( 1993, 1997), and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini ( 1996) discuss optimal taxation issues, and show that the optimal tax plan consists in accumulating government assets in the short run and setting all taxes equal to zero in the long run. The implications for the optimal taxation of factor incomes in all these endogenous growth models differ from the traditional Chamley-Judd result about the optimality of long-run zero taxation of capital income and positive taxation of labor income in neoclassical exogenous growth models (Judd 1985; Chamley 1986 King (1980) , and Stern (1992) argued that on theoretical grounds uniform consumption taxation is not unambiguously superior to income taxation. Feldstein (1978) and Boskin (1978) focussed instead on the quantitative effects of the taxation of capital income on the long-run capital-labor ratio and income per capita. Specifically, Feldstein (1978) argued that capital income was taxed excessively and that large efficiency gains could be obtained by eliminating the capital income tax and replacing it with a labor income or consumption tax. Summers (1981) extended the work of Feldstein and Boskin by considering an optimal growth model with endogenous savings decisions. He argued that if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high and the time horizon of the agent is very long, the savings rate will be very sensitive to its real return and a change in capital income taxes would have a very strong effect on the accumulation of capital and the long-run capital-labor ratio in the economy.3 Normative analysis by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) showed that when the tax instruments available are a capital income tax and a labor income tax, the optimal long-run tax on capital income is zero while it is positive for labor income; the same result is obtained when a labor income tax is replaced by a consumption tax.
More recently, the study of the interaction between tax policy and economic growth has been stimulated by the development of endogenous growth theory. Several authors have used these models to study both positive and normative aspects of tax policy. Lucas (1990) , King and Rebelo (1990) , Kim (1992) , Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993), Pecorino (1993) , Devereux and Love (1994), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995) among others use simulations in order to quantify growth and welfare effects of tax reforms, such as, for example, a shift from income to consumption taxes or a lowering of capital income taxes. Although the quantitative growth and welfare effects identified by these studies differ considerably, they all point out that consumption taxation induces fewer distortions than capital and labor income taxation. Optimal taxation analysis by Bull (1993) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) shows that the optimal long-run values of all distortionary taxes (including the consumption tax) are zero when there is no restriction on the government' s intertemporal borrowing and lending decisions and leisure is modeled as "raw time." The optimality of zero long-run taxation of human and physical capital is, intuitively, a consequence of the well-known public finance principle that intermediate goods should not be taxed (Diamond and 3. Numerical simulations presented by Summers suggested that replacing income taxes with consumption taxes would lead to a 18 percent increase in steady-state income, driven by a large increase in the longrun capital-labor ratio. These steady-state gains have to be weighed against the costs of lower consumption along the transition. Such transitional costs are explicitly taken into account in simulations from OLG general equilibrium models by Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983), Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley ( 1983), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff ( 1987). The benefits of switching from an income tax to a consumption tax (or a labor income tax) are confirmed, but the average welfare gains are lower (of the order of two percentage points of income).
Mirrlees 1971).
In endogenous growth models, consumption and income taxes have different growth and welfare effects, the growth effects of consumption taxes being in general less strong.
In next three sections, we focus on the channels through which taxes affect resource allocation and growth, and on their sensitivity to the specification of the model. In section 6 we also review quantitative findings and empirical evidence.
THE MODEL
We consider a three-sector economy. The first sector produces final goods (and physical capital); the second produces human capital and the third produces a nonmarket good a leisure activity that can take the form of "home production," "quality time," or"raw time."
I Technology
Physical output is produced with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology that uses human capital H and physical capital K as inputs. The technology is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:
where v(u) is the fraction of physical (human) capital devoted to the production of goods. The capital stock is assumed to depreciate at the rate 6. Human capital is produced by households with a CRS technology that uses both human and physical capital as inputs, as in Rebelo (1991) . "Education" is therefore a nonmarket activity. In section 3.2 we discuss the case in which the production of human capital is a market activity, whose inputs are taxed. Human capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate 6, equal for simplicity to the depreciation rate of physical capital, and to have a Cobb-Douglas production function:4 Ht = B(xtKt)t(ztHt) D-bHt (2) where x(z) is the fraction of physical (human) capital devoted to the accumulation of human capital. An alternative specification of the education technology, intermediate between nonmarket and market specifications, would feature market goods instead of physical capital as an input in the education sector, as in Heckman (1976) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). We shall discuss its implications in sections 3.2 and4.
4. Stokey and Rebelo ( 1995) show that the growth effects of taxation are not very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which is restricted to equal unity in the Cobb-Douglas case. Results generalize to the case in which the technologies are CRS with positive cross-derivatives. The assumption about depreciation allows the derivation of a simple closed-form solution for the growth rate, without affecting the qualitative nature of the results.
The Government
The government finances public expenditure using factor income taxation and bonds. In order to ensure that public expenditure does not become negligible with respect to the size of the economy, we assume that in the long run it grows as the same rate as output. Without loss of generality, we assume that government bonds are tax exempt. The instantaneous budget constraint faced by the government is given by Bt = rtBt + Gt-Tt where Bt are government bonds, rt is their rate of interest, and Tt is total tax revenue. The usual no-Ponzi-game condition applies. In every period, the resource constraint of the economy is given by Kt= Yt-bKt-Ct-Gt where C is private consumption and G is government expenditure.
Private Agents
The economy is inhabited by identical atomistic agents. They operate the human capital accumulation technology described in equation (2) and they rent human and physical capital to firms. Consumption, investment, and allocation of human and physical capital are chosen so as to maximize the utility function: P00 U = JO e Ptu(Ct, Lt )dt
where p is the rate of time preference, and L is a "leisure activity," which is specified later. We assume that the instantaneous utility function exhibits a Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (CIES):
where 0 is the inverse of the IES. This reduces to u(C, L) = log C + nlog L when 0 = 1. This functional form has been shown to be consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) . Consumers maximize utility subject to the constraint on human capital accumulation given by (2) and to their budget constraint. Given that they can invest in physical capital and in bonds, their net rates of return must be the same (r = RK( 1-TK)-6). If we define nonhuman wealth W as K + B, the budget constraint can be expressed as follows:
where RK, RH, TK, and are the rates of retum and the tax rates on capital and labor income, respectively, and Tc is a consumption tax. We shall consider three alternative specifications of the leisure activity: "raw time," "home production," and "quality time." In the first, leisure is the fraction of time that is not spent working and "studying": 
Firms
Firms rent capital from households at the rate of interest RK and hire labor at the wage rate R. They use these factors to produce goods with the technology described by equation (1). They hire labor and capital up to the point at which their marginal product equates their marginal cost: If human capital was a market activity, a similar set of conditions would apply for the wage and rental rates in that sector.
THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The representative consumer takes the paths Of RH, RK, TK, TH, and Tc as given and chooses the paths of C, W, K, H, u, v, x, z to maximize (S) subject to (2) and (7). ( 14) establishes the long-run equality in rates of return between the sector producing goods and the one producing human capital. Equation (15), valid at each point in time, is derived from the equality in the relative net rates of return on physical and human capital in the two sectors. Equation (16) establishes that in the long run human capital grows at the same rate as consumption and physical capital. Equation (17) is the equality between the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure and the real rate of return on human capital, and holds at each point in time. Finally, equation ( 18) 
Human Capital as a Market Good 6
Assume that new human capital is produced in a market sector by firms, rather than individuals, and that factor income tax rates are independent of whether the factor is employed in the human capital or final goods sector. Clearly, the gross and net rates of return on human and physical capital have to be the same in both sectors. We also allow for a government subsidy to the purchase of new human capital by individuals, that reduces its price by a factor 1-5H
[see Judd (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini ( 1996) for a discussion]. With respect to the case considered in the previous subsection, the equilibrium rate of return on human capital [equation (14)] will now be calculated net of the labor tax rate and of the subsidy:
Since both sectors are now fully taxed, the relation between the optimal capital/labor ratios in production and education (equation 1S) is now independent of tax rates:
The semireduced form for the growth rate can be expressed as follows: (20), since income from capital is fully taxed, while the labor tax (divided by the subsidy wedge 1 -sH), has the same effect as in ( 19).
The Model with "Home Production"
Evaluating the FOCs for the home production model when H is nonmarket along the balanced growth path we obtain equilibrium conditions similar to those derived above, with x replacing 1 -v. There are, however, a few differences. In particular, conditions (12), (14) and (17) now take the form:
An additional equilibrium condition reflects the optimal allocation of physical capital between production of consumption goods and of leisure:
Solving for Y the system formed by (12b), (13), (14b), and (15) (with xreplacing 1 -v) we obtain the following reduced-form expression for the growth rate: 
and the semireduced form for the growth rate is
Y = ( [D( l-T K )(X ( I-T H )D( I a ) (o) + ( l-O) )(a + Z)) ]
Inspection of ( l9), (23), and (25) reveals that the "quality time" case is intermediate between the raw time and the home production case. As cl) tends to 1, we get the "home production" case (with o = O); as X tends to 0, we get the raw time case.
TAXATION AND LONG-RUN GROWTH
We turn now to a discussion of the channels through which taxes affect long-run growth in the class of models we are considering, and we then state some formal propositions. We take as benchmark the "leisure as raw time" model when human capital is a nonmarket sector? and highlight the differences with alternative model specifications. When we examine the long-run effects of changing a tax rate, an important point should be highlighted. Changing a tax rate will imply a change in government revenue as a fraction of GDP. Since we focus on the balanced growth path, and government spending is taken to be a constant fraction of GDP, we are implicitly changing the long-run level of government debt or assets (as a fraction of GDP). Because of Ricardian equivalence between debt and lump-sum transfers, this is tantamount to assuming that the additional tax revenue gets rebated to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. An alternative approach, not pursued here, would be to consider revenue-neutral changes in tax policy.
T/e "Raw Time " Model
Inspection of the system of equations ( 12) Irrespective of the value of 0, K.i + K.ii + K.iii < 0: that is, the overall effect of a capital income tax on growth is negative, as pointed out by Devereux and Love ( 1994) (see Appendix 1 for a formal proof).
7. See the Appendix for a sketch of the formal proof, which is constructed along the lines of Devereux and Love ( 1994). The intuitive argument goes as follows. For given labor supply, a higher capital income tax reduces the growth rate, creating a negative wealth effect which induces higher labor supply. On the other hand, higher taxation induces agents to substitute leisure for work. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/0 is high, the substitution effect dominates and labor supply declines. As can be seen from (20), the subsidy 5H works in the direction of offsetting the negative effect of the labor tax on the rate of return in the human capital sector. With regard to the other forms of taxation, all channels identified earlier will be operative. In addi-8. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
tion, the fact that factor incomes in the education sector are taxed implies that the labor tax has a stronger direct effect on growth with respect to the case in which education is a nonmarket activity, that is still operative even when D = 0. This happens because the labor tax directly reduces the rate of return in the sector producing human capital [compare equations (14a) and (14)].
Alternative Specifications of Leisure
The specification of the leisure activity has important implications for the long-run effects of taxes on economic growth. Consider first the case in which leisure does not provide utility ( = 0), so that u + z = 1. Now equation ( 
Taxes and Long-Run Growth: Main Results
In summary, factor income taxes are growth reducing in most endogenous growth models; whether a consumption tax is also growth reducing depends on the specification of the leisure activity. The effect of labor and capital income taxes on growth in models where there is no leisure or where leisure is CRS in reproducible factors depend on two factors: the technology for human capital accumulation and the tax treatment of the education sector. We now state the main results more formally. The first two propositions restate results derived in Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini ( 1996) regarding the effects of factor income taxation on growth.
PROPOSITION 1: If leisure is modeled as "raw time " the balanced growth rate of the economy always depends negatively on the tax rates on capital and labor income, regardless of whether H is a market good and of its technology. (20) show the direct effects of taxes on growth, for given time spent working or studying. Capital and labor taxes have additional indirect ef-fects on growth through their impact on u + z. Appendix 1 outlines a proof that the overall growth effect is negative. || The intuition for the result can be more easily obtained by considering the case where l = O, in which case the growth rate can be expressed as Bz-6.9 Consider the effects of an increase in the labor tax: while the relative cost of and return to working versus accumulating human capital are unchanged, the return to the leisure activity is increased with respect to the return to work since the time spent in leisure is untaxed. The ensuing increase in time spent in leisure reduces the utilization rate of human capital (u + z) and therefore reduces the return to a unit of human capital. As a result, time spent accumulating human capital and the growth rate are both decreased. A similar argument can be made for the effects of changes in capital income taxes on growth, as well as to show that the growth rate depends on the two tax rates when 6 is positive. PROPOSITION 2: In the home production model and when there is no leisure, the effects offactor income taxation on long-run growth depend on the human capital accumulation technology and on whether the human capital sector is tax exempt. When physical capital enters directly in the production of human capital ( > O), both factor income taxes reduce long-run growth. When a = O, the balanced growth rate of the economy is independent of the tax rate on capital income; it is independent of the tax rate on labor income only if the H sector is untaxed.
PROOF: Equations ( 19) and

PROOF: See equations (23) and (24). 11
The intuition for this result goes as follows. If human capital is produced with human capital only in an untaxed sector, an increase in the labor tax rate reduces the return to human capital and the opportunity cost of education (and, if the model includes home production, the return to the leisure activity) by the same amount. Therefore, the fraction of time spent studying which in this case determines the growth rate is unchanged. If instead the education sector is subject to taxation, an increase in the labor tax reduces only the returns to education and therefore its accumulation.
The intuition for the result when a is positive is easier to present for the case of no leisure (but is the same in the equivalent cases of leisure as "quality time" or "home production"). We showed above that when D = O, the return to and the cost of human capital accumulation (that is, the net of tax wage) are affected in the same proportion by a change in labor taxes, leaving the time allocation decision unchanged. In other terms, since the cost of human capital accumulation is effectively tax deductible, labor income taxation does not affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. However, if physical capital is also used in the production of new human capital ( > O), the return to human capital is reduced more than its cost. In particular, the cost of physical capital inputs used in the production of human capital is not reduced by the labor income tax since these inputs are not tax deductible. When the education sector is nonmarket but uses market goods [see equation (21) Finally, note that the real interest rate in the "home production" model (and in the quality time model when co = 1 ) is the same as in a model with no leisure ( = O). This equivalence results from the fact that leisure is modeled as a nonmarket activity produced with constant returns to scale to reproducible factors, and can therefore be reinterpreted as a nonmarket consumption good. PROPOSITION 3: When leisure is either "raw time" or "quality time" with decreasing returns in human capital, a consumption tax reduces long-run growth. (19) and (25) show that the growth rate depends on the fraction of leisure time. Inspection of the systems of equations (12)- (18) and (12c), (13), (14c), and (15)-(18) reveal that both u and z are a function of xC, and therefore Y is a function of xC. Appendix 1 proves that leisure time is increasing in xC, and therefore growth is reduced. || The apparent contradiction between Proposition 3 and the claim by Rebelo (1991) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995) that changes in consumption taxes have no growth effects can be explained as follows. Rebelo considers a case in which the additional tax revenues from an increase in the consumption tax are not rebated in a lump-sum fashion to consumers. In this case, the income and substitution effects of the consumption tax on labor supply cancel out, so that the leisure choice is unaffected and changes in consumption taxes have no growth effects. This experiment is equivalent to a change in consumption taxes together with an increase in government spending. In our model, spending is constant as a fraction of GDP and therefore the extra revenue generated by the consumption tax is rebated in a lump sum to consumers (or reflected in higher private-sector assets), thus offsetting the income effect. The substitution effect causes a reduction in labor supply and, therefore, a reduction in the growth rate. PROPOSITION 4: A consumption tax has no effiect on the long-run growth rate of the economy in the "home production" model and its subeases.
PROOF: Equations
PROOF: See equations (23)-(24). ||
The intuition for this proposition is simple. In models where leisure is an activity produced with CRS in reproducible factors, the choice between labor and leisure does not affect long-run growth, because human capital is always fully employed in productive activities. A consumption tax affects the relative consumption of "market goods" and "home-produced goods" (leisure) but generates no incentive to reduce physical and/or human capital accumulation since both types of goods are produced with CRS in accumulable factors.
There is a difference between the home production (or quality time) model and a model with no leisure. In the former, the consumption tax reduces the ratio of consumption to leisure and has an effect on the overall capital/labor ratio of the economy. In the latter, a consumption tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax, since it does not affect any resource allocation decision. The difference between these models is quite logi- The intuition for this result goes as follows. In the "raw time" model a labor tax has two effects: a direct effect of discouraging accumulation of human capital (by decreasing the returns to be earned on education) and an indirect effect on the number of hours spent in working/education activities. The first effect is exactly offset by a subsidy to human capital accumulation; the subsidy, however, does not modify the second effect which, analogously to a consumption tax, increases the number of hours spent in the untaxed activity (leisure).
A corollary of this Proposition and of Proposition 4 is that in models in which leisure is "home production" a subsidy to human capital accumulation completely offsets any growth effect of a labor tax. A labor tax will, however, still affect the allocation of resources (inter alia, the ratio between consumption and "leisure"). Finally, note that if investment in physical capital were to be tax deductible, the direct effects of the capital income tax on economic growth would disappear, analogously to the case of the labor tax in the presence of a subsidy to human capital accumulation. The capital income tax would retain its indirect effects through its impact on the choice of leisure hours.
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND GROWTH-MAXIMIZING TAX POLICY
The previous section has highlighted the channels through which different taxes affect economic growth and resource allocation. A number of contributions have studied the tax policy that a benevolent social planner would choose in order to maximize the representative agent's welfare. This is known as a "Ramsey planner's problem" (Ramsey 1927) , and can be solved in different ways (see Lucas 1990 and Judd l99S).
A formal treatment of this problem when the government is freely allowed to borrow and lend is presented in the working paper version of this paper. For most model specifications the optimal tax policy consists in setting all taxes equal to zero in the long run, with public spending financed out of the return on government assets that are accumulated through budget surpluses along the transition path. These results, analo-gous to those obtained by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), derive from the fact that in an endogenous growth framework any tax that distorts intertemporal decisions has large and permanent costs (in terms of present discounted value of lost consumption and utility) and should therefore be set equal to zero. This suggests that the solution to the optimal taxation problem is characterized mainly-by the time profiEle of taxation, featuring high taxation in the short run and no taxation in the long run, a point stressed by Jones et al. (1997) (see also Judd 1995). Simulations by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) show that reliance on the consumption tax during the transition is high.
The solution to the optimal taxation problem has the unrealistic feature that the government should accumulate budget surpluses in order to finance future government spending through the returns on its assets. This suggests that in order to derive more realistic implications from this analysis the optimal taxation problem should be formulated differently for example, by imposing restrictions on the government's ability to borrow and lend intertemporally. We briefly consider here the limiting case in which the government has to balance the budget period by period, and we focus on the growth-maximizing structure of taxation in the long run, rather than on welfaremaximizing tax policy. To our knowledge, Pecorino ( 1993) provides the only formal analysis of this issue. For reasons of tractability, we limit our analysis to the case in which labor supply is inelastic. This implies that a consumption tax has no growth effects, so that the analysis is restricted to the study of the optimal combination of human and physical capital taxation. 1 1
We conducted this exercise for the case in which human capital is a nonmarket sector and for the case in which it is a market sector. While Pecorino ( 1993) has to rely on simulations to characterize the growth-maximizing tax policy except for the special case in which capital intensities are the same across all sectors, we are able to find closed-form solutions. PROPOSITION 6: Assume that labor simpply is inelastic. When human capital is a nonmarket sector, the growth-maJcimizing structure of income taxation requires physical capital and labor to be taxed equally. When human capital is a market sector, the growth-maximizing structure of income taxation requires physical capital to be taxed more heavily than labor when a > > and vice versa.
PROOF: See Appendix 2. || When human capital is a nonmarket sector, the growth-maximizing tax policy in the long run consists of equalizing taxation of labor and physical capital. When human capital is a market sector, the equality of tax rates breaks down: if the sector producing consumption goods (and physical capital) is more capital intensive, the growthmaximizing combination of tax rates will feature higher taxation of physical capital and vice versa. This result derives from the principle that in order to increase the growth rate, the sector producing consumption goods should be taxed more heavily 11. For the more general case in which a consumption tax has growth effects, we speculate that the growth-maximizing tax structure would still feature heavy reliance on the consumption tax, given that it has growth effects only through the labor/leisure decisions while factor income taxes also affect directly accumulation decisions. than the sector producing capital goods, as also stressed in Pecorino (1993) . When the sector producing human capital is not taxed, however, relative capital intensities cease to matter: the equalization of tax rates is due to the fact that the elasticity of longrun growth with respect to tax changes is proportional to their contribution to revenue [see equations (A6) and (A7)].
TAXES AND GROWTH: QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS
As pointed out in section 1, several authors have studied the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of tax reforms by calibrating models so as to reflect features of real world economies (typically, the United States). Lucas (1990) , King and Rebelo (1990) , Kim (1992) , Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) and Pecorino (1993) consider the same policy experiment of a shift from capital income taxation to a consumption tax and/or labor tax in the context of endogenous growth models, obtaining substantially different growth and welfare effects. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) show that these different estimates depend on the models' structure and calibration, and argue that, although growth effects of tax reforms are likely to be modest, the welfare effects can be substantial because of the large reallocation of factors across sectors. Similar findings are reported by Devereux and Love (1994), who show that explicit consideration of transitional dynamics is important for the evaluation of the welfare consequences of tax reforms. They also provide an analytical characterization of these dynamics following a number of revenue-neutral tax changes, and show that increases in the capital income tax are more "costly" than increases in the labor income tax because they involve a large reduction in the capital/labor ratio as factors are shifted to the production of human capital.
In addition to the theoretical studies we have discussed so far, there have been a number of empirical studies that have examined the cross-country evidence on the effects of taxes on economic growth, such as Koester and Kormendi (1989), Engen and Skinner (1992) , and Easterly and Rebelo (1993a, b) . Because of the difficulty in constructing comparable, consistent measures of tax rates for a sufficiently large number of countries, these empirical studies rely on aggregate measures of the tax burden, such as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, as a proxy for average effective tax rates, or on sums of statutory income tax rates or income tax returns weighted using income distribution data, as a proxy for aggregate marginal tax rates. Although results differ from study to study, a common feature is that it is difficult to identify statistically significant effects of taxes on economic growth once other determinants of long-run growth are controlled for.
The tax measures used in these studies are rough approximations of the tax variables defined in the models, and do not distinguish between different types of taxes. However, more detailed cross-country studies of the tax structure, such as King and Fullerton (1984) on the taxation of income from capital, have focussed on a small sample of countries. Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997) use tax measures constructed following the methodology developed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) to study the effects of labor, capital, and consumption taxes on private investment and growth in a panel of nineteen OECD countries. Their findings, especially for factor income taxes, are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with those predicted by theory and model calibration exercises. Private investment is found to be significantly negatively correlated with labor and capital income taxes, and positively correlated with consumption taxes. Income taxes enter with a negative coefficient in growth regressions, although their effects are for the most part statistically and economically insignificant. These studies confirm the importance of focussing on the composition of tax instruments when examining the macroeconomic implications of taxation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we examined the macroeconomic effects of consumption and factor income taxation on resource allocation, economic growth, and welfare. In particular, we have underlined the role played by the technology for human capital accumulation, the tax treatment of the "education" sector, and the nature of the leisure activity in determining the effects of labor, capital, and consumption taxes.
It was shown that a consumption tax involves only one fundamental distortion it affects the choice between time spent in "productive" activities (labor and education) and in leisure time in favor of the latter, and therefore reduces the growth rate of the economy. This choice is affected in a similar fashion by income taxes, but these also involve other distortions that reduce capital accumulation and growth. Unrestricted optimal taxation exercises yield in general zero taxation of both factor incomes and consumption in the long run, with accumulation of govemment assets along the transition path. We have therefore focussed on the growth-maximizing choice of factor income taxes and found that it critically depends on the relative capital intensity of the goods and the education sector, as well as on whether the education sector is a taxed market sector. Further insights can be gained by introducing heterogeneity among economic agents, in order to address distributional considerations, and by explicitly considering transitional dynamics. 
